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Abstract
The public can now friend the White House and scores of agencies on
social networks, virtual worlds, and video-sharing sites.  The Obama Admin-
istration sees this trend as crucial to enhancing governmental transparency,
public participation, and collaboration.  As the President has underscored,
government needs to tap into the public’s expertise because it does not have all
of the answers.
To be sure, Government 2.0 might improve civic engagement.  But it also
might produce privacy vulnerabilities because agencies often gain access to
individuals’ social-network profiles, photographs, videos, and contact lists
when interacting with them online.  Little would prevent agencies from using
and sharing individuals’ social-media data for more than policymaking, in-
cluding law enforcement, immigration, tax, and benefits matters.  Although
people may be prepared to share their views on health care and the environ-
ment with agencies and executive departments, they may be dismayed to learn
that such policy collaborations carry a risk of government surveillance.
This Essay argues that government should refrain from accessing individ-
uals’ social-media data on Government 2.0 sites.  Agencies should treat these
sites as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see government’s activities and
engage in policy discussions but where government cannot use, collect, or dis-
tribute individuals’ social-media information.  A one-way mirror policy
would facilitate democratic discourse, enhance government accountability,
and protect privacy.
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Introduction
President Barack Obama has 1,867,060 MySpace friends,1 and
Andy is one of them.2  After the 2008 election, Andy hoped that his
MySpace friendship with the President would help him keep up with
the Administration’s policy endeavors.  Andy’s profile included a vari-
ety of personal information, including his hometown, birthday, politi-
cal views, friends, and interests.  It featured photos of Andy’s recent
trip to Tijuana, Mexico, and noted his enthusiasm for sales and gang-
ster movies.
Unbeknownst to Andy, the Drug Enforcement Administration
was investigating a drug ring in his hometown that maintains ties with
dealers in Tijuana, Mexico.  In connection with the investigation, a
data mining program analyzed the profiles of the executive branch’s
social network of friends and identified Andy as a person of interest.
Agents included Andy in a drug-trafficking and terrorist watchlist.3
Although Andy had no connection to the drug ring, his inclusion on
various watchlists cost him a job offer and prevents him from traveling
by airplane.
Although Andy’s predicament is hypothetical, the privacy risks
attendant to government’s use of social media are not.  In January
2007, Connecticut police arrested Ken Krayeske, a freelance journalist
1 MySpace—Barack Obama, http://www.myspace.com/barackobama (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
2 Although Andy’s story is of my imagination, it may soon be routine if we permit Gov-
ernment 2.0 to proceed unchecked.
3 Federal agencies share intelligence and information with state and federal agencies and
law enforcement through fusion centers, which facilitate the “information sharing environment”
mandated by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. See
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Fixing Fusion Centers: Restoring Liberty and Enhanc-
ing Security in the Post-9/11 World 10 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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and law student, during the gubernatorial inaugural parade.4  Police
officers recognized Mr. Krayeske from a Connecticut Intelligence
Center security bulletin.  Law enforcement identified Mr. Krayeske as
a potential threat based on his blog postings encouraging protests of
the Governor’s inaugural ball, his service as a Green Party candidate’s
campaign manager, and his previous arrest at an antiwar rally.5  After
Mr. Krayeske spent thirteen hours in jail, prosecutors dropped the
charges.6  State legislators and the Governor roundly criticized Mr.
Krayeske’s arrest and appearance on a threat list.7
Civic engagement could increasingly entail the risk of domestic
surveillance as government learns more about individuals’ online ac-
tivities.  Unfortunately, Government 2.0 is no exception.  In January
2009, President Obama’s “Transparency and Open Government”
memorandum ordered executive departments and agencies to adopt
new technologies that would enhance governmental transparency,
public participation, and collaboration.8  True to this policy, the White
House “stay[s] connected” with the public through social-network
sites, microblogging, and video-sharing sites.9  The Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention provides health information to the public
via Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and Twitter.10  National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration officials interact with the public on a vir-
tual island in Second Life.11
Government’s use of social media12 offers great promise.  It al-
lows agencies and executive departments to reach millions of individu-
4 Gerri Willis, Are You on the List?, CNN, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/video/#/
video/crime/2009/09/30/willis.fusion.centers.cnn.
5 Gregory B. Hladky, Arrest Exposes State’s Threats List: Activist’s Rights Trampled, Rell,
State Lawmakers Say, NEW HAVEN REG., Jan. 9, 2007, at A1.
6 Id.
7 Jennifer Medina, Arrest of Activist Troubles Hartford Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007,
at B6.
8 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
9 The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (urging the
public to connect with the White House on MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, iTunes, YouTube,
Vimeo, LinkedIn, and Flickr).
10 Social Media at CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/socialmedia/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
11 Outreach at Earth System Research Laboratory, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/outreach/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
12 This Essay focuses on government’s use of social media, i.e., networked technologies
that enable the production and sharing of digital content in mediated social settings.  This char-
acterization includes social-network sites where users post personal information, view their net-
work of relations to others, and communicate with others in their network. See danah m. boyd
& Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008) (discussing social-network sites like MySpace, Facebook,
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als at trivial cost.  It permits them to broadcast updates on pressing
matters13 and to post research data.14  It has the potential to facilitate
discussions between agencies and citizen-experts on policy matters15
and will surely entice people who might otherwise not engage with
government to join those discussions.16  Indeed, the Administration
has been successful in translating the public’s embrace of networked
technologies during the 2008 presidential campaign into an interest in
interacting with the Administration online.17
Government 2.0 sites depart from the traditional model of public
participation.  In the past, individuals interacted with government in
ways that had little connection to their personal lives.  They com-
mented on rulemakings, offered expert testimony, and participated in
town hall meetings.  At present, people engage with government in
networked environments organized around social connections.18  As
James Grimmelmann has explored with great insight, social-network
YouTube, Flickr, Bebo, LinkedIn, etc.); Frederic D. Stutzman & Woodrow N. Hartzog, Bound-
ary Regulation in Social Media 5–6 (Oct. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
13 See Hilton Collins, Emergency Managers and First Responders Use Twitter and
Facebook to Update Communities, EMERGENCY MGMT., July 27, 2009, http://www.emergency
mgmt.com/safety/Emergency-Managers-and-First.html.
14 See, e.g., Data.gov, http://www.data.gov/ (“The purpose of Data.gov is to increase public
access to high value, machine readable datasets generated by the Executive Branch of the Fed-
eral Government.”).
15 BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOVERN-
MENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 20–21, 40–42 (2009);
Eric E. Holdeman, Opinion, Twitter: Five Lessons for Emergency Managers from Iran, GOV’T
TECH., June 23, 2009, http://www.govtech.com/gt/697201; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Open
Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 358 (arguing that an open code model for govern-
ance can encourage public participation in the administrative state, improve political accounta-
bility, and marshal expertise).
16 Many individuals might not have interacted with government about policy due to the
considerable transaction costs associated with writing letters, calling agency staffers, and submit-
ting comments on rulemaking.  They also may have declined to do so due to their age and life
experiences.  In the past, younger Americans may not have engaged with executive agencies and
the White House because government may have seemed too remote or disinterested in their
concerns.  As the 2008 presidential election demonstrates, today’s youth has become increasingly
involved with political campaigns and government decisionmaking, both offline and online.
17 The Pew Internet and American Life Project recently reported that thirty-seven percent
of social-network site users expect updates from the Obama Administration via social-network
sites and thirty-four percent expect to hear from the Administration via email. AARON SMITH,
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA MEMO 1 (2008), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/PIP_Voter_Engagement_2008.pdf; see also
AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008
(2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The_Internets_Role
_in_Campaign_2008.pdf (documenting the public’s avid involvement in the 2008 campaign).
18 See danah boyd, Friends, Friendsters, and Top 8: Writing Community into Being on So-
cial Network Sites, FIRST MONDAY, Dec. 4, 2006, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
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sites are inherently social—individuals create their identities, cement
relationships, and accumulate social capital by revealing a wealth of
personal information.19  This imbues their interactions with a sense of
trust and confidentiality.20
Bringing government into these socially driven spaces presents
new challenges for privacy.21  Social-network sites facilitate two-way
interactions—agency “friends” have access to individuals’ profiles,
musings, photographs, videos, and miniblogs just as individuals can
view agencies’ postings.22  Nothing prevents agencies from collecting,
analyzing, and distributing individuals’ social-media data23 for law en-
forcement, immigration, benefits determinations, and other purposes.
Nonetheless, individuals like Andy may be dismayed to learn that
their collaboration with the White House or a federal agency entailed
the risk of persistent government surveillance.
Some might attribute this problem to the convergence of the pub-
lic and private spheres and seek to resolve it with these concepts in
mind.24  Yet doing so may complicate matters more than it illuminates
them.  Because the terms public and private lack intrinsic meaning, the
index.php/fm/article/view/1418/1336 (suggesting that social-network sites create a community
through the process of “friending”).
19 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009).
20 Id. at 1159–60. Social-network sites like MySpace and Facebook are less about
networking as they are about socializing inside of preexisting networks.  danah boyd, Social Me-
dia Is Here to Stay . . . Now What?, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/
MSRTechFest2009.html.
21 Although this Essay refers to microblogging sites like Twitter in passing, it does not
focus on them, as they may engender privacy norms that differ from social-network sites and the
like. Compare danah boyd, supra note 20 (explaining that Twitter users see their activities as
involving the “public square” and hope to garner the attention of the wider public), with Stutz-
man & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 13 (explaining that individuals often maintain separate work
and personal Twitter accounts due to privacy concerns).
22 As Part I explains, social-media providers treat agencies like any other users of their
service, thus permitting them to access their friends’ social-media information if their privacy
settings permit.  To date, only Facebook does not follow this model; instead, agencies generate
“fans,” not friends, there.  While agency Facebook “fans” can comment on an agency’s postings
and interact on live chats about policymaking, government cannot view their fans’ profiles in
their entirety.
23 This Essay uses the terms social-media data, social-network information, and social-net-
work data interchangeably to refer to information revealed on social-media sites that does not
involve feedback on policy matters.
24 See ARISTOTLE, Book 1, in POLITICS 3–13 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1944) (1932) (explaining his concept of the public state and the private family); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68–74 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (discussing
the interaction between the struggle of liberty—the private self—and authority—the public
sphere).
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boundary between them is not sharp.25  As a result, discourse about
public and private spheres focuses on a multitude of concepts, some
overlapping, making it difficult to categorize many circumstances.26  A
public/private binary also may not accord with our lived exper-
iences—individuals routinely carve out zones of privacy in so-called
public spaces.27  Thus, notions of the public and the private may not
provide an effective tool to resolve Government 2.0’s privacy
dilemma.
This Essay argues that government should refrain from accessing
individuals’ social-media data.  It contends that government should
view Government 2.0 sites as one-way mirrors, where individuals can
see government’s activities and engage in policy discussions but where
government cannot use, collect, or distribute individuals’ social-media
information.  This would advance the goals of open government.
Strong privacy rules enhance deliberative democracy by encouraging
participation and by discouraging self-censorship.
I. What Is Government 2.0?
President Obama is widely known as the “first tech president,”28
and his “Open Government” initiative demonstrates this moniker’s
accuracy.29  On January 21, 2009, the President ordered executive de-
partments and agencies to adopt “new technologies” that would “put
information about their operations and decisions online” and improve
the public’s ability to participate and collaborate in policymaking.30
The President has urged the adoption of social media because “gov-
ernment does not have all the answers and public officials need to
25 Duncan Kennedy has explained that the public/private distinction is so incoherent that
it cannot help us describe, explain, or justify anything.  Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the De-
cline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
26 Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law
and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 247–50 (1987) (arguing that the public/private distinction col-
lapses on itself, has no objective content, and is incoherent).  For example, the economy involves
the public arena for some; it implicates the private sphere for others. Id. at 250–52.
27 Cf. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 66–70 (2001) (noting that employees create privacy spaces in public workplaces).
Stutzman and Hartzog argue that social-network sites defy the public/private categorization—
users have privacy expectations that instead fall along a continuum, from complete anonymity,
to practical obscurity, to complete transparency.  Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 14.
28 Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, WIRED, Mar. 25,
2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/government-agen/.
29 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009); see also Macon
Phillips, WhiteHouse 2.0, posting to The White House Blog (May 1, 2009, 14:03 EDT), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/05/01/WhiteHouse/.
30 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
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draw on what citizens know.”31  Social media provides government
with an inexpensive way to garner the expertise and feedback of mil-
lions of individuals.32
Government 2.0 permits a “two-way interaction between govern-
ment and its citizens” through online comments, live chats, and mes-
sage threads.33  For instance, the President’s Facebook page asks:
“Have thoughts on the President’s priorities on science and technol-
ogy?  Join the live chat.”34  The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (“FEMA”) explains to subscribers and friends on its YouTube
video channel that it hopes to provide the public with a chance “to see
how FEMA operates in communities across America, comment on
disaster response and recovery, and learn how to prepare homes and
communities for all hazards.”35  The State Department connects with
the public on LinkedIn36 and maintains an embassy in Second Life.37
States, municipalities, and emergency responders have embraced
social media as well.38  For instance, the Los Angeles Fire Department
distributes videos to friends and subscribers on YouTube, befriends
citizens on MySpace, and urges users to share photos and videos on
Facebook.39
31 Beth Noveck, Enhancing Citizen Participation in Decision-Making, posting to The
White House Blog (June 10, 2009, 13:08 EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Enhancing-Citi-
zen-Participation-in-Decision-Making/.
32 Facebook now has over 250 million members.  Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Hits a
Quarter Billion Users, CNET NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-
10287336-36.html.  MySpace has over 100 million members.  Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
2d 843, 851 n.8 (W.D. Tex. 2007); see also Jon Swartz, MySpace Cranks Up Heat in Facebook
Turf War, USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 2007, at 1B.  They have different audiences in these networked
environments—MySpace and Facebook communities tend to have different socioeconomic
backgrounds, ages, nationalities, etc. See danah boyd, supra note 20.
33 Saul Hansell, The Nation’s New Chief Information Officer Speaks, posting to The New
York Times Bits Blog (Mar. 5, 2009, 14:57 EST), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/the-
nations-new-chief-information-officer-speaks/.
34 The White House, posting to Facebook—The White House (Aug. 6, 2009, 14:20 EST),
http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse.
35 YouTube—FEMA’s Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/fema?blend=1&ob=4 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009).  The Federal Trade Commission has a YouTube channel as well.  You-
Tube—FTCvideo’s Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/FTCvideos (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
36 U.S. Department of State Company Profile, LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/compa-
nies/u.s.-department-of-state (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
37 L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, From Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST. J., May
12, 2008, at A13.
38 See Hilton Collins, Emergency Managers and First Responders Use Twitter and
Facebook to Update Communities, GOV’T TECH., July 27, 2009, http://www.govtech.com/gt/
701799.
39 Id.
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Generally, the government interacts with social-media users just
as any individual participant would.  Social-network sites like My-
Space provide agencies access to individuals’ personal information
(assuming their privacy settings permit) and vice versa.  Agencies
might be able to view individuals’ videos, photographs, political and
religious affiliations, and revealing commentary.  Video-sharing sites
like YouTube operate in a similar way.  Agencies can see information
and videos that friends and subscribers share with others.40  By con-
trast, the social-network site Facebook designates the friends of gov-
ernment agencies and corporations as fans whose social-media
information cannot be accessed.41
Government 2.0 certainly has potential to heighten the public’s
awareness of, and ability to provide feedback on, policymaking.  Cau-
tion is, however, in order.  Social-media scholar Clay Shirky warns
that government’s rush to adopt Web 2.0 technologies may end in “ca-
tastrophe.”42  The next Part addresses what Shirky may have been al-
luding to—the privacy risks of Government 2.0.
II. The Privacy Risks of Government 2.0
Civic engagement and privacy have long enjoyed an uneasy rela-
tionship.  Working for a political advocacy group might expose one’s
policy views to interested agencies, but it also might unexpectedly lead
to the release of sensitive personal information to the government.
This phenomenon was true during the 1950s and 1960s when officials
in the South sought the names and addresses of NAACP members43
and when the Federal Bureau of Investigation spied on activists in the
civil rights and anti–Vietnam War movements whom it viewed as
threats to national security.44
This risk has continued into the twenty-first century.  In 2005 and
2006, Maryland State Police officers conducted surveillance of human
rights groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents to identify
40 Saul Hansell, Should the White House Be a Place for Friends?, posting to The New York
Times Bits Blog (May 4, 2009, 10:24 EDT), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/should-the-
white-house-be-a-place-for-friends/.
41 Id.
42 Interview with Clay Shirky by Meet the Innovators (June 15, 2009), http://me-
dia.bonnint.net/wtop/15/1560/156071.mp3 (available online in mp3 format).
43 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 453, 466 (1958) (striking down Alabama court order
requiring NAACP to produce list of its members on the grounds that privacy in group associa-
tion is indispensable to preserving the freedom to associate).
44 WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS 95, 165–66 (1990).
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potential “threats.”45  The investigation resulted in the classification of
fifty-three nonviolent political activists as “terrorists,” including two
Catholic nuns and a former Democratic candidate for local office.46
More recently, the Missouri fusion center47 issued a report discussing
the modern militia movement in which it suggested to law enforce-
ment officials that these “extremists” are supporters of third-party
candidates like Ron Paul and Bob Barr.48  Individuals labeled as ex-
tremists did little more than affiliate with groups opposed to govern-
ment policy.49
Government 2.0 could contribute to this trend.  While social me-
dia permits individuals to provide feedback to government on poli-
cymaking, it also provides government access to their social-media
data, including their group affiliations and other sensitive information.
Unlike the civil rights activists of the 1950s, who surely would not
have willingly provided Southern officials access to their personal in-
formation, individuals today establish online connections with govern-
ment that make them vulnerable to surveillance.  Government could,
in fact, learn more about individuals from Government 2.0 sites than it
could from traditional law enforcement tactics given the breadth of
personal information that individuals voluntarily reveal online.50  This
Part explores the nature of Government 2.0’s privacy risks and why
individuals often fail to appreciate them.  It concludes by exploring
current law’s inability to adequately address these concerns.
45 Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at 1A.
46 Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists: Greens and Nuns, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A18,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/07/nation/na-cop-spy7; Lisa Rein, Maryland Po-
lice Surveillance Listed Some Activists as Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1.
47 See supra note 3.
48 MO. INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., MIAC STRATEGIC REPORT: THE MODERN MILITIA MOVE-
MENT (2009), available at http://www.firearmscoalition.org/images/news/miac-militia-2009.pdf.
49 Chad Livengood, Agency Apologizes for Militia Report on Candidates, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Mar. 25, 2009, at 1A.  The fusion center intended the report only for the
eyes of police officers—it was made public after being leaked on the Internet. Id. The fusion
center apologized to former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Bob Barr, and Chuck Baldwin for
linking them to the modern militia movement in the report. Id. The Missouri fusion center has
ceased distribution of the February 20, 2009 report.  Chad Livengood, State Retracts Militia Re-
port, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Mar. 26, 2009, at 1A.
50 While a traditional investigation might require police to obtain a warrant to gain access
to sensitive personal information residing on a person’s computer, for instance, there is no such
requirement for Government 2.0 sites, which may give government access to similarly revealing
personal information that individuals voluntarily post.
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A. Privacy Harms
Government 2.0 sites can interfere with individuals’ privacy in va-
rious ways.  Agencies may use individuals’ social-media information
for purposes other than garnering feedback on policy.  A party can
intrude on another’s privacy by using information for “purposes unre-
lated to the purposes for which the data was initially collected without
the data subject’s consent.”51  Daniel Solove’s insightful taxonomy of
privacy problems describes this as a “secondary use” privacy
intrusion.52
Rather than using a person’s social-media data for policymaking
purposes, executive departments and agencies could share it with law
enforcement, immigration, and tax authorities.53  This possibility is not
remote.  Law enforcement regularly analyzes social-network informa-
tion to identify criminals, terrorists, and other threats.54  Police depart-
ments reportedly have a constant presence on MySpace and Facebook
to identify sex offenders, murderers, and other criminals.55  For in-
stance, detectives in Auburn, Maine, explain that they obtain “photos
of crimes” that suspects post on their social-network profiles.56  Den-
ver’s Joint Information Center monitored social-network sites and
blogs during the 2008 Democratic National Convention to gain intelli-
gence on potential saboteurs.57
51 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 131 (2008).
52 Id. at 129–33; see Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism
and the Value of Privacy in the Information Age, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2010) (reviewing
Daniel J. Solove’s Understanding Privacy).
53 It is crucial to note that nothing suggests that agencies have already engaged in such
secondary use of their friends’ social-media data.  This Essay urges government to adopt policies
that would preclude this possibility, which the law, to date, largely does not.
54 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3, at 12–13.
55 Jim McKay, The New Neighborhood Watch, GOV’T TECH., Sept. 2009, at 24.  In The
Netherlands, law enforcement agencies use social-network data to learn about criminal activity
and to monitor affiliates of known criminals.  Joseph Bonneau et al., Prying Data Out of a Social
Network (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jra40/publica-
tions/2009-ASONAM-prying-data.pdf.
56 McKay, supra note 55, at 28.  I use this example not to suggest that law enforcement
may never use social-network data in their investigations.  Quite the contrary.  As Part III dis-
cusses, the one-way mirror policy ought to be cabined to instances where government uses so-
cial-network sites to garner feedback on government policy and to engage citizens in democratic
discourse.  Government could use other social-network data for investigative purposes if the law
so permits.
57 Jeannette Sutton, The Public Uses Social Networking During Disasters to Verify Facts,
Coordinate Information, GOV’T TECH., July 30, 2009, http://www.govtech.com/gt/706523.  It ap-
pears that the Denver fusion center obtained social-media data from the Internet, i.e., informa-
tion that individuals released to the public through blogging and social-network sites.  This
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The intelligence community has expressed interest in following
law enforcement’s lead.  The National Security Agency has funded re-
search on the production of intelligence from social-network data.58
Although individuals may be prepared to tell the White House their
views about health care or the environment, they may not expect the
agency to collect and distribute their social-media data for other
purposes.
An agency’s secondary use of social-media data could have harm-
ful consequences.  Individuals may face erroneous arrests.59  For ex-
ample, British police mistakenly arrested the host of a birthday party
after he invited seventeen friends to an “all-night party” on
Facebook.60  Officers identified the Facebook posting as important ev-
idence that the party might turn into an illegal rave or music festival.61
Individuals could also be incorrectly placed on watchlists.62  They
might be denied government benefits or asylum if the government
mistakenly determines that their social-media data contradicts infor-
mation provided on their applications.
To make matters worse, law enforcement could distribute such
erroneous designations to countless other public and private actors
through the information-sharing environment, compounding the error
in ways that are difficult to detect and eliminate.63  Once social-media
data makes its way to other entities’ databases, it can be used in disad-
vantageous ways.  This is especially likely as the information has been
taken out of its original context and thus is subject to
misinterpretation.64
example demonstrates law enforcement’s use of social-media data generally, not the sharing of
Government 2.0 data with fusion centers and the like.
58 Paul Marks, Pentagon Sets Its Sights on Social Networking Sites, NEW SCIENTIST, June 9,
2006, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19025556.200-pentagon-sets-its-sights-on-social-net
working-websites.html?full=true.
59 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (discussing the arrest of Ken Krayeske at a
gubernatorial inaugural parade in Connecticut because law enforcement identified him as a po-
tential threat due to his blog posts urging others to protest the parade, his work on Green Party
campaigns, and his prior arrest at an antiwar rally).
60 Police Pay Flying Visit to Halt 30th Birthday Party, TIMES (London), July 17, 2009, at 27.
61 Id. According to the host, the police arrived in a helicopter to “stop 15 people eating
burgers.” Id.
62 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1274–75 (2008) (discussing the misidentifications that occur because of the “No Fly” computer
matching system).
63 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3.
64 See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (exploring the reputational damage inflicted when information is read online out of its
original context).
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Government could also use social-media data to identify sensitive
information about individuals, including their group associations and
sexual orientation.65  Although individuals might deliberately avoid
including this information in their profiles, the government could infer
these excluded details by looking at the information imparted by
others in their social network.66  For instance, a student experiment at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology demonstrated the ease with
which a person’s sexual orientation can be identified by examining a
person’s online friends.67  Using publicly available data from
Facebook, a software program determined if a person was gay based
on the gender and sexuality of that person’s friends.68  Although the
student researchers had no way of checking all of their predictions,
their computer program appeared accurate based on their outside
knowledge.69
Even if individuals decline to reveal sensitive information online,
agencies could employ computer algorithms that infer such informa-
tion about them based on their social contacts.  Agencies could iden-
tify a person’s involvement in unpopular groups.70  They could also
make assumptions about individuals that are incorrect.  As Katharine
Strandburg explores in her insightful work, individuals might face sur-
veillance based on their legitimate associations.71  They might, in turn,
refrain from joining certain groups and causes to avoid arousing suspi-
cion.72  The possibility of government surveillance might chill identity-
forming and expressive activities.73
65 This concern might apply to social-network sites that permit users to become fans of
government agencies if government can access the names of their fans’ friends, which it appears
that Facebook does. See Facebook Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=12277 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009) (“Pages cannot see the profiles of their fans.  They can only see the profile
photo and the name of each of their fans.”); see also Bonneau et al., supra note 55.
66 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1174.
67 Carolyn Y. Johnson, Project ‘Gaydar,’ BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2009, at K1, available
at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/project_gaydar_an_mit_experi-
ment_raises_new_questions_about_online_privacy?mode=PF.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amend-
ment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 759–60 (2008).
71 Id.
72 Individuals may find it easier to censor themselves than to de-friend an agency or execu-
tive department.  Individuals also may be unaware that they could de-friend an agency.
73 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 525–26 (3d ed.
2009).  Christopher Slobogin has argued that governmental surveillance of expressive activities,
such as a speech at a park rally, can chill conduct, even though it takes place in public and is
meant to be seen by others.  Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Pub-
lic Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 253–55 (2002).  As Solobogin recog-
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Furthermore, an agency’s friendship with one user may have pri-
vacy consequences for others.74  Agencies could gain access to social-
network data of their contacts’ contacts.75  James Grimmelmann ex-
plains this phenomenon: “[i]f Hamlet and Gertrude are contacts, then
when Gertrude accepts Claudius’s contact request, she may compro-
mise Hamlet’s privacy from Claudius.”76  Such privacy spillover may
result in government’s use, collection, and distribution of someone’s
contacts’ social-network information.  This spreads the web of individ-
uals whose privacy loss may lead to a false arrest, inclusion on a
watchlist, or denial of government benefits.77
Finally, the government’s use of social-media data may defy the
privacy norms of Web 2.0 site users.  Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of
contextual integrity bases privacy protections on the norms of particu-
lar contexts.78  It assesses the kind of information that users share in
certain arenas and the typical flow of information there.79  As the next
Part explores, government’s use of individuals’ social-media data for
nonpolicy purposes would transgress the norms of information flow in
social-network sites.
B. Individuals’ Privacy Expectations for Government 2.0
Individuals who interact with government on social-media sites
fail to appreciate their privacy risks and do not expect government to
pay attention to, let alone use, their social-media data.  People partici-
pate in social-network sites for social reasons.80  They reveal personal
nized, the Supreme Court rejected a similar assertion in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Id.
Nonetheless, Laird might not foreclose a First Amendment argument against automated surveil-
lance if social-network site users appreciated the risk, as it might present a direct “compulsion”
against speech acts that the First Amendment would prohibit. Id.
74 See Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1174–75.
75 This is true if the privacy settings of government’s contacts’ contacts permit.  Many peo-
ple allow friends of friends to see their profiles. See id. at 1174.  Indeed, some permit anyone
living in their geographic area to see their profiles.  On the other end, some only allow friends to
do so.  Research suggests that some users do not use these settings at all, id. at 1185, meaning
that the social-network site’s default privacy rules govern who can view their profile (which is
often not protective of users’ privacy).
76 Id. at 1174.
77 See id. at 1174–75.
78 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEG-
RITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 6–7 (2009); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH.
L. REV. 119, 138–40 (2004) [hereinafter Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity].  Daniel
Solove offers a comprehensive, pragmatic theory of privacy that requires decisionmakers to bal-
ance the multitude of interests at stake in a given situation. SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 87–88.
79 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 78, at 138–40.
80 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1151.
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information as a means to say who they are, make new friends, and
cement personal connections.81  In doing so, people underestimate so-
cial media’s privacy risks because social-network sites engender feel-
ings of trust.82  Seeing contacts’ names and pictures conveys the notion
that users are engaging in “a private space, closed to unwanted
outsiders.”83
People also have a sense that their social-network information
will be kept private because they feel anonymous amidst the millions
of social-network users.84  As noted social-media researcher danah
boyd explains, social-network participants “live by security through
obscurity, where they assume that as long as no one cares about them,
no one will come knocking.”85  They operate under the assumption
that only close friends will pay close attention to their online activi-
ties.86  Notably, social-network users fail to appreciate how many peo-
ple can, and do, access their information.87  For this reason, the
possibility of future employers, government, or corporations reading
their profiles seems remote.88  As James Grimmelmann explains, the
design of social-network environments effectively impairs individuals’
ability to appreciate their privacy risks.89
81 Id.; see also danah boyd & Jeffrey Heer, Profiles as Conversation: Networked Identity
Performance on Friendster (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
vis.berkeley.edu/papers/friendster_profiles/2006-Friendster-HICSS.pdf.
82 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1160–64.
83 Id. at 1162.
84 Id. at 1161–62. My previous work Cyber Civil Rights explores how an online group’s
feeling of anonymity breeds destructive behavior online.  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 81–84 (2009).
85 danah boyd, Social Network Sites: Public, Private, or What?, 13 THE KNOWLEDGE TREE
4, 7 (2007), http://kt.flexiblelearning.net.au/tkt2007/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/edition_13.pdf.
86 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1161.
87 Id. at 1168.
88 Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online
Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 20, 31 (2008).  This view is, of course, mis-
taken—more than half of all employers check a person’s social-network activities in making
interviewing and hiring decisions.  A 2006 survey of 100 executive recruiters reported that 77%
of recruiters used search engines to find background data on candidates and 35% eliminated a
candidate based on what they uncovered. Casting a Digital Shadow; Your Reputation Precedes
You, BRIAN SOLIS, July 17, 2009, http://www.briansolis.com/2009/07/casting-a-digital-shadow-
your-reputation-precedes-you.  Ralph Gross attributes people’s willingness to divulge a wealth
of personal information on social-network sites to a herd effect—they see others doing so and
follow their lead.  Ralph Gross et al., Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Net-
works (The Facebook Case) 80 (Nov. 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacy-facebook-gross-acquisti.pdf.
89 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1162.  Because Government 2.0 is so new, social scien-
tists have yet to study individuals’ privacy expectations associated with it.
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The public’s initial reaction to Facebook’s adoption of “News
Feed” seems to illustrate the point.  The News Feed feature permitted
users to see every act taken by all of their friends—who befriended
whom, what someone wrote on another’s wall, the new groups some-
one joined, etc.—when signing onto the site.90  Immediately thereaf-
ter, over 700,000 users joined the Students Against Facebook News
Feed group.91  Although Facebook users could discover this informa-
tion by visiting their friends’ profiles, they opposed News Feed be-
cause it made them feel exposed, much like a person in a room with
loud music would feel if someone turned the music off unexpectedly
and others could hear her talking loudly.92  Facebook users disliked
how News Feed informed all of their friends about their activities.93
News Feed felt like an intrusion—individuals did not expect, or want,
acquaintances to check their profiles closely.94  It also offended users’
senses of control over their information, and Facebook’s refusal to no-
tify them before its adoption no doubt angered them further.95
This research provides insight into individuals’ privacy expecta-
tions for Government 2.0.  When individuals see President Barack
Obama’s smiling face on MySpace, they may experience feelings of
trust.  This is true not only because people feel that they know politi-
cians,96 but also because Government 2.0 sites suggest that agencies
are only interested in the public’s policy views.  When the President
tells social-network users that their views matter to him, he sends the
message that government wants their policy feedback.  Nothing in-
forms individuals that government desires their social-media data for
purposes other than policymaking, such as law enforcement.
Online commentary provides anecdotal support for this notion.
In describing Government 2.0, a commentator wrote: “While the UK
Home Office is planning to gain access to social-networking sites to
snoop on its citizens, the Obama administration seeks to use the same
technology to engage with voters [and] find out what they want.”97
90 danah boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Conver-
gence, 14 CONVERGENCE 13, 13 (2008).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 14–15.
93 Id. at 15.
94 Id. at 13–14.  In an ironic but perhaps expected turn of events, News Feed is now one of
Facebook’s most popular features.
95 I thank Woody Hartzog for this insightful point.
96 Lawrence M. Friedman, The One-Way Mirror: Law, Privacy, and the Media, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 319, 327 (2004).
97 Anonymous, posting to eParticipation (Mar. 27, 2009, 19:54 EDT), http://eparticipa-
tion.com/content/government-agencies-use-social-networking-sites.
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Moreover, social-network users may believe that the President and
government agencies will not scrutinize their profiles because they ex-
pect nonintimate friends to refrain from monitoring their online
activities.
To be sure, users might anticipate the possibility that a govern-
ment friend might randomly notice their personal data while assessing
their feedback on policy.  But they would not expect government to
collect, use, and distribute it systematically to law enforcement, immi-
gration, tax, and other government authorities.  Individuals share per-
sonal information on social-network sites to develop relationships, not
because they want government to use it for law enforcement, taxation,
and beyond.  This distinction is crucial to understanding individuals’
privacy expectations in Government 2.0.
Moreover, social-network sites do little to counteract individuals’
mistaken impressions—they hide any mention of privacy and under-
score the benefits of disclosing personal data.98  They make privacy
less salient to maximize information disclosure on their sites.99  This
may explain why individuals fail to change a social-media site’s default
privacy settings, which are designed to maximize the visibility of users’
profiles.100  In short, individuals may be unable to appreciate the great
differences between befriending individuals and government agencies
and may fail to understand the privacy risks engendered by Govern-
ment 2.0.
C. Absence of Robust Legal Protections
Our current legal framework cannot adequately address these
privacy concerns.  In May 2009, the General Service Administration
(“GSA”) entered into terms-of-service agreements with social-net-
work sites, such as MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube.101  GSA offi-
cials explain that they had no opportunity to raise privacy concerns in
98 Joseph Bonneau & Soren Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the Market for Data Pro-
tection in Social Networks 29–30 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
preibusch.de/publications/Bonneau_Preibusch__Privacy_Jungle.pdf; Bruce Schneier, Facebook
Should Compete on Privacy, Not Hide It Away, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 15, 2009, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/15/privacy-internet-facebook.
99 Richard Goettke & Joseph Christiana, Privacy and Online Social Networking Websites
2 (May 14, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs199r/fp/
RichJoe.pdf.  Privacy information does not appear anywhere on the MySpace homepage, and
although it allows users to change their settings, it is not user-friendly. Id. at 4.  Social-network
sites also discourage users from invoking restrictive privacy settings; they tell users that doing so
would “make it more difficult for [them] to network with their friends.” Id. at 2.
100 Gross et al., supra note 88.
101 Jeff Chester, Federal Gov’t (GSA) Refuses to Make Public Agreements with Facebook,
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their negotiations, as they had so little bargaining power vis-a`-vis so-
cial-network providers who had little desire to host government
sites.102  The agreements only tackled issues that, if omitted, would
have precluded the government from using social-network sites, such
as indemnification, jurisdiction, intellectual property, and
advertising.103
Federal law provides little protection from Government 2.0’s pri-
vacy risks.  The Privacy Act of 1974 sets the basic conditions under
which the federal government collects, uses, and discloses personally
identifiable information.104  It covers “systems of records” under
agency control,105 including those administered by private companies
on the government’s behalf.106  The Privacy Act, however, does not
apply if the government accesses information gathered by third par-
ties, such as commercial data brokers.107  Because the government
would retrieve individuals’ network data from third-party sites in a
manner akin to its retrieval of information from data-broker
databases, the Privacy Act may not apply here.
Conversely, the Privacy Act would apply to social-media data in-
corporated into an agency’s own system of records. That protection,
however, may provide little help to individuals like Andy, as the Pri-
vacy Act largely exempts information used, collected, and distributed
for intelligence and criminal investigations from its requirements.108
In that case, individuals enjoy limited access, accuracy, and correction
rights vis-a`-vis their personal information.109
MySpace, etc., posting to Digital Destiny (Apr. 30, 2009, 13:38 EDT), http://
www.democraticmedia.org/jcblog/?p=801; Snyder, supra note 28.
102 David Temoshok, Presentation at the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Government
2.0: Privacy and Best Practices Workshop 157 (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_gov20_June2009_transcripts_day1.pdf.
103 Id. at 157–59.
104 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
105 See Letter from Daniel J. Chenok, Chairman of Info. Sec. & Privacy Advisory Bd., to
Peter Orszag, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget 11 (May 27, 2009), available at http://
csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/correspondence/ispab-report-may2009.pdf.
106 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).
107 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Com-
mercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 595, 595–97 (2004).
108 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
109 Id.  The Privacy Act precludes agencies from collecting information that exclusively
concerns individuals’ First Amendment activities.  That restriction does not, however, apply
when the information gathered addresses more than just the person’s speech acts.  In turn, its
protections, in practice, reach too few scenarios, as law enforcement routinely collects, uses, and
distributes information relevant to far more than a person’s political, religious, and other expres-
sive activities.  Andy’s story demonstrates the point.
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The E-Government Act of 2002 updated the Privacy Act by re-
quiring agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments (“PIAs”)
when developing or procuring information technology systems that in-
clude personally identifiable information.110  The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (“OMB”) guidelines allow agencies to exempt
government’s use of private sector databases from the requirement to
conduct PIAs when the data is not “systematically incorporate[d] into
existing information system databases.”111  The E-Government Act
does not apply to information generated on social-network sites if
agencies decline to incorporate individuals’ social-network informa-
tion into their databases.  If, however, an agency systematically
downloads the social-media data of more than ten people, it would be
obliged to produce a privacy-impact assessment report.112  This cer-
tainly could provide considerable protection for individuals if the
agency made clear that it would not access or use individuals’ social-
media data for purposes other than getting feedback on policymaking.
To date, no such privacy impact assessments exist.
III. Protecting Privacy and Enhancing Civic Engagement
with a One-Way Mirror Policy
This Part begins by proposing a one-way mirror policy that would
permit individuals to provide feedback to government but would pre-
vent government from using, collecting, or distributing individuals’ so-
cial-media information.  Then, it demonstrates how this approach can
protect privacy and advance the animating principles of the Open
Government initiative—governmental transparency, participation,
and collaboration.  It ends by countering important critiques of this
approach.
A. The One-Way Mirror Proposal
Government 2.0’s privacy policy should resemble a one-way mir-
ror.113  This approach would allow individuals to see and talk to the
110 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b), 116 Stat. 2899, 2921.
111 Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads
of Executive Dep’ts & Agencies, at Attachment A, Part II.E.2.f (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/.
112 Id.
113 This Essay uses the image of a one-way mirror to help guide our thinking about the
government’s ability to use, collect, and distribute individuals’ personal information on social-
network sites.  I recognize that the precise image of a mirror may not map perfectly onto every
nuance of the proposal.  For instance, one could argue that government’s ability to obtain indi-
viduals’ policy advice means that it has glanced back into individuals’ views.  Nonetheless, the
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government but ban the government from accessing individuals’ so-
cial-media data.  Individuals could examine government’s postings,
participate in policy discussions, and share their expertise with govern-
ment.  At the same time, a one-way mirror policy would forbid gov-
ernment from using, collecting, or distributing individuals’ list of
contacts, wall musings, videos, photos, and other social-media data.
Facebook’s fan pages resemble this approach.  On Facebook,
agencies and corporations generate fans whose profiles remain largely
inaccessible to them.  Those entities cannot view fans’ profiles, photo-
graphs, videos, political and religious affiliations, or commentaries.
Unfortunately, agencies and corporations can, however, view an
abridged list of a Facebook fan’s social contacts.114  A one-way mirror
policy would prohibit government from using or distributing that
abridged list for any purpose, such as the identification of a fan’s
group associations.115
In short, this proposal creates a presumption of openness as to
policy-related matters and a presumption of privacy as to individuals’
social-network information.  Although it would require government to
adhere to this policy, it would not mandate that third parties alter
their sites in any way.  This solution is a legal one, not a technical one.
This proposal could be pursued in various ways.  Congress could
adopt legislation enshrining the one-way mirror policy into law.116  Al-
ternatively, the OMB could incorporate this proposal into its regula-
tions.117  Agencies could adopt it through policy statements or
rulemakings.118  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has
already taken the lead on this issue, sponsoring an agency-wide con-
ference on the privacy implications of Government 2.0 and soliciting
image provides a powerful way to understand the extent to which government can use its Gov-
ernment 2.0 sites to obtain personal information about individuals.
114 Government could not view a fan’s entire list of contacts.
115 See notes 63–79 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy problems associated with
government’s use of social-media data to infer individuals’ group associations).
116 See Geoffrey D. Kravitz, Short Essay and Book Note, REAL ID: The Devil You Don’t
Know, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 445–46 (2009).  This might be a particularly fruitful time to
consider legislative action, as privacy advocates such as the Center on Democracy and Technol-
ogy have devoted much time to thinking of ways to update the Privacy Act to account for
networked technologies.  But, as Paul Schwartz notes, such legislative change may come at too
steep a price—the preemption of state privacy laws and ossification of legislation. See Paul M.
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 929–30 (2009).
117 I thank Peter Swire for his helpful comments on how we might implement the one-way
mirror proposal.
118 Of course, agencies should adopt technology-neutral policies to prevent obsolescence.
The policy should provide means for individuals to protest an agency’s infringement of its terms.
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public feedback as well.119  DHS could draft a privacy impact assess-
ment incorporating the one-way mirror policy, which other agencies
might follow.
The one-way mirror policy would not, however, extend beyond
Government 2.0 sites, i.e., ones that aim to enhance governmental
participation, collaboration, and transparency as the Open Govern-
ment memorandum suggests.120  In other words, law enforcement
would only be prohibited from asking agencies for their Government
2.0 friends’ social-media data in cases where law enforcement identi-
fied agency friends as criminal targets.121  The one-way mirror policy
would not prevent law enforcement from independently investigating
publicly available social-network profiles and blogs.  Intelligence and
law enforcement could continue their efforts to infiltrate groups sus-
pected of criminal activity through social media.122  This policy only
aims to commit Government 2.0 to its declared purpose—garnering
public insight on policy matters.  As the next Section demonstrates,
strong privacy rules will, in fact, advance that effort.
Although this proposal looks to law to address Government 2.0’s
privacy risks, social-network sites have an important role to play here
as well.  Sites like MySpace would be wise to adopt analogs of
Facebook’s fan pages, even though law would by no means require it.
A particular site’s adoption of fan pages for Government 2.0 efforts
would surely enhance user loyalty if stories like Andy’s emerge re-
garding government’s misuse of social-media data on other sites.
Facebook’s competitors will ultimately follow its lead if they believe
that users have a taste for such fan pages.
B. Promoting Democratic Participation and Transparency
The one-way mirror policy is crucial to producing the kind of en-
gaged citizenry that the President imagines in his Open Government
initiative.  Deliberative democracy cannot thrive without strong pri-
vacy rules.123  Privacy allows speakers and listeners to feel that they
119 Public Workshop Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,876
(Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Apr. 17, 2009).
120 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
121 In other words, law enforcement cannot contact the White House or other agency to
view a government friend’s profile (now criminal target) without legal process.
122 Law enforcement agents could continue to pursue undercover operations online so long
as those operations comported with law.
123 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 837 (2000).
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can express themselves without reprisal.124  It permits them to experi-
ment with ideas.125  Neil Richards explains that private intellectual ex-
ploration and confidential communication protect our ability to
develop new beliefs and to discover new truths.126
Without privacy protections, democratic participation in cyber-
space may be elusive.127  Paul Schwartz cautions: “[W]ho will speak or
listen when this behavior leaves finely grained data trails in a fashion
that is difficult to understand or anticipate?”128  In other words, when
“widespread and secret surveillance becomes the norm, the act of
speaking or listening takes on a different social meaning.”129  As Joel
Reidenberg contends, a citizen’s right to participate in government
depends upon the right to privacy in her personal information.130
With strong privacy rules, individuals may be more inclined to
participate in Government 2.0.  They might engage with government
on social-media sites and continue to watch videos in an uninhibited
way.  Government’s online friends may be less likely to censor their
postings and would feel free to support unpopular groups or causes.131
This ensures that individuals produce more informed discourse.132
Without a one-way mirror policy, government may lose intelligent
commentary from those who appreciate Government 2.0’s privacy
risks.
This proposal would play an expressive role as well.  Beyond its
coercive power, law establishes a public set of meanings and shared
understandings between the state and the public.133  It educates the
124 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1651
(1999).
125 SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 79–80.
126 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 416–17 (2008).
127 See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 837.
128 Schwartz, supra note 124, at 1651.
129 Id.
130 Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 497–98 (1995).
131 Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Manage-
ment in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–19 (1996) (arguing that digital copyright-man-
agement technologies violate First Amendment freedom of speech and thought).
132 Individuals’ personal information seems out of place in any discussion of the Open Gov-
ernment initiative.  Indeed, White House spokesperson Moira Mack remarked via email “we are
focused on opening government to the people (and not the other way around).” The White
House Is Now Following You on Twitter . . ., posting to The Podium (May 4, 2009), http://interne-
tinnovation.org/blog/entry/the-white-house-is-now-following-you-on-twitter.  This suggests that
the White House and executive agencies have no interest in that information.
133 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1571 (2000).
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public about the government’s values and commitments.134  In that
way, the one-way mirror policy would express to the public that civic
participation and collaboration is its highest priority.  It would com-
municate that government will not compromise the goals of open gov-
ernment in pursuit of other aims.  This message seems crucial to dispel
the public’s distrust in government, something the Obama Adminis-
tration seems eager to combat.
C. Objections
Some will suggest that individuals have no privacy in information
divulged on social-network sites because they have turned the private
into the public by sharing it with others.  The answer, however, is not
that simple.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, the fact that infor-
mation is divulged to others “does not mean that an individual has no
interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”135
Scholars like Lior Strahilevitz have explored the pitfalls of drawing a
sharp line between what is public and what is private.136  Their criti-
cism is particularly apt as to social-network sites where privacy is “not
simply about zeros and ones; it is about how people experience their
relationship with others and with information.”137
Others will contend that people should know better, that once
you friend the President or a government agency, you have opened
yourself up to persistent surveillance.138  But as social-network re-
134 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022
(1996); cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harass-
ment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 404–14 (2009) (exploring law’s expressive power in conveying
government’s commitments).
135 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770
(1989); see also Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and Confidential
Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473561, at 8–13 (describing the disclosure of per-
sonal information in online communities and its potential consequences).
136 Consider Lior Strahilevitz’s critique of the public disclosure tort, where an individual’s
sharing of information with a few people or, in some jurisdictions, with one other person can
waive a person’s expectation of privacy.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).  As Strahilevitz explains, a restrictive view of privacy
fails to capture how information actually flows in given relationships. Id. In other words, a
binary view of privacy—where disclosure to more than one person eviscerates any privacy pro-
tection—cannot capture the fact that something may be public vis-a`-vis coworkers yet private
vis-a`-vis the outside world. Id. at 940. Strahilevitz’s social-network theory would instead ex-
amine the actual structure of social networks and the “extent of dissemination the plaintiff
should have expected to follow his disclosure of that information” to decide whether information
would have become widely known. Id. at 921.
137 boyd, supra note 90, at 18.
138 Danielle Citron, Why We Should Care About Privacy in a Government 2.0 World, post-
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search makes clear, individuals often do not know better.139  They may
be unable to distinguish government agencies from distant acquaint-
ances who they believe are not watching their every move.140
Moreover, individuals may not appreciate the vastly different
consequences of friend-ing government agencies and individuals.  If
an acquaintance sees something damning on an individual’s page and
discloses it to others, the individual might suffer reputational and
emotional harm for which he can pursue civil damages.  If, however, a
government agency collects, uses, and distributes the information, the
person may end up under investigation, be refused government bene-
fits, or appear on a government watchlist.  There may be no means to
redress this breach of trust.  Individuals will be unable to grasp these
differences and the privacy risks that Government 2.0 poses.
Some may reject any attempt to limit government’s access to so-
cial-media data on the grounds that law enforcement can simply ob-
tain the information online from individuals whose privacy settings
fail to protect the data.  In other words, technology has already deci-
mated users’ privacy; the genie cannot be returned to the bottle.  Such
technological determinism, however, should not dictate policy.  War-
ren and Brandeis rejected that sort of thinking in their seminal article,
“The Right to Privacy.”141  As Jeffrey Rosen argues, we can make “so-
cial choices about how much privacy we as a society think it is reason-
able to demand.”142
Privacy officials have asked whether we should embrace a notice
regime along the lines of the Privacy Act, rather than adopting a flat
ban on the use, collection, and distribution of individuals’ social-media
data.143  On this view, the sole responsibility of the government is to
ing to Concurring Opinions (June 20, 2009, 18:05 EDT), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2009/06/why-should-we-care-about-the-privacy-implications-of-government-20.html
(Comment by Jake) (“If you put stuff on the Internet, expect people to read it.  Most folks who
put stuff on the Internet probably expect this.”).
139 See supra notes 80–100 and accompanying text (discussing social-network users’ privacy
expectations).
140 It may be more likely that individuals perceive government as more akin to distant
acquaintances than corporations they friend online.  Individuals may be more likely to appreci-
ate that corporations have a profit motive to use their data.  We expect Coca-Cola, Amazon, or
Verizon not to act in our best interests.  On the other hand, we may get confused as to the
government’s motives and whether they are aligned with our own.  Social scientists have yet to
study these nuances.
141 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
142 ROSEN, supra note 27, at 195.
143 Martha Landesberg, Presentation at the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Government
2.0: Privacy and Best Practices Workshop 121, 140–41 (June 22, 2009), available at http://
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make sure that the social-media sites that they use have clear policies
that tell consumers what could be done with their information.144
James Grimmelmann views this option as “completely unrealistic.”145
He suggests that people tend not to appreciate notice.146  Although
Facebook’s privacy policy bears a TRUSTe seal, Facebook users
“don’t read it, don’t understand it[, and] don’t rely on it.”147  Thus,
even if government agencies posted a well-written privacy policy on
their Government 2.0 sites, users are not likely to be protected by it.
Conclusion
Government 2.0 presents exciting opportunities and serious chal-
lenges.  While social-media sites could attract more members of the
public to participate in agency policymaking, especially the digital-na-
tive generation, they could erode privacy in ways that undermine the
participatory goals of open government.  A one-way mirror policy
would ameliorate that problem, facilitating democratic discourse with-
out engendering privacy risks.
It also has potential uses beyond Government 2.0.  Companies
and nonprofit organizations might consider adopting one-way mirror
policies, either through technology or practice, when interacting with
individuals on social-network sites.  This move would permit nongov-
ernmental entities to get the public’s feedback about their services
while protecting their privacy.
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_gov20_June2009_transcripts_day1.pdf (asking pan-
elists whether a notice regime might suffice to address privacy concerns of Government 2.0).
144 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1181.
145 Id.
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